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I. INTRODUCTION
Early in life, one discovers that there are two topics to be avoided in “civilized”
conversation—politics and religion; in fact, their blood-boiling effects are outdone
by only one other topic—the politics of religion. Although many argue that little, if
any, “civilized” conversation occurs on Capitol Hill, few can dispute the fact that the
politics of religion have been the center of many Congressional debates in recent
years. For example, in June of 1998, Congress, by joint resolution, proposed an
amendment to the United States Constitution aimed at restoring religious freedom.1
1

Constitutional Amendment Restoring Religious Freedom, H.R.J. Res. 78, 105th Cong.
(1998); 144 CONG. REC. H4078-04 (daily ed. June 4, 1998).
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Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999

1

250

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:249

Likewise, the House passed the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.2
Previously, in 1993, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was signed into law to
prevent government from substantially burdening an individual’s free exercise of
religion.3 Finally, for more than four years, both Houses of Congress have been
proposing an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19644 in the form of
the Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA).5
The Workplace Religious Freedom Act is the focus of this note.6 The Workplace
Religious Freedom Act represents another Congressional attempt to fortify the
“reasonable accommodations” and “undue hardship” standards of Title VII with
regard to religious discrimination in the workplace;7 the WRFA does so in the face of
Supreme Court decisions which have narrowed the scope of those standards,8 eased
burdens on employers, and valiantly guarded the citadel of the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause.9
Specifically, this note will analyze the potential constitutional infirmity of the
Workplace Religious Freedom Act in light of Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and the Court’s rather murky guidance on the constitutionality of existing Title VII
standards. The Establishment Clause concerns created by the WRFA must be
considered seriously because the aforementioned religious air on Capitol Hill assures
that the WRFA will be resurrected in the 106th Congress. This note ultimately
suggests that the WRFA distorts the meaning of “accommodation,” places too great a
burden on employers, and disproportionately raises religious interests above secular
2

H.R. 2431, 105th Cong. (1998); 144 CONG. REC. H3294 (daily ed. May 14, 1998).

3

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 had been codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-4
(1994), but the law was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
4

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1998); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (giving the definition of
“religion”).
5

See S. 1124, 105th Cong. (1997) (Version 2); see also S. 92, 105th Cong. (1997) (Version
1); H.R. 2948, 105th Cong. (1997). Apparently, Hon. Jerrold Nadler of New York introduced
the Workplace Religious Freedom Act in 1994. See 140 CONG. REC. E2157-01, (daily ed. Oct.
6, 1994). Also, House Bill 2948 was reintroduced into the House by Hon. William F.
Goodling of Pennsylvania on Tuesday, January 27, 1998. See 144 CONG. REC. E4-02 (1998).
6

This note will analyze the 1997 Senate Version 2 of WRFA.

7

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Under Title VII, the term “religion” includes “all aspects of
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”
Id.
8

See Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that bearing more
than a de minimis cost to accommodate an employee’s religious needs constitutes an undue
hardship on the employer); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68-69 (1986)
(holding that an employer is not required to adopt the reasonable accommodation that is most
beneficial to the employee).
9

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
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economic concerns of the workplace—all of which add up to a losing battle on the
Establishment Clause front.
While not discounting the importance of religious observance in everyday life,
this note concludes that Title VII should be left as is, and that, perhaps, the interests
of religious observers—especially Sabbatarians—could be bolstered under the
auspices of other existing, and more broadly-based, labor and employment
legislation.
II. EVOLUTION OF TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as originally enacted, prohibited
employers from failing or refusing to hire, from discharging, and from discriminating
against any individual regarding compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.10 However, the 1964 version of Title VII did not include the “reasonable
accommodations” requirement for employers which exists in the current form.11
“Reasonable accommodations” evolved out of guidelines enacted by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).12 In 1966, the EEOC first
10

Title VII—Equal Employment Opportunity, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255
(1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 stated, in
part, the following:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
11

Id. at §§ 701-703; see also supra note 7.

12

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, as originally established, was given
power with regard to the following:
(1) to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional, state, local, and other
agencies, both public and private, and individuals;
(2) to pay to witnesses whose depositions are taken or who are summoned before the
Commission or any of its agents the same witnesses and mileage fees as are paid to witnesses
in the courts of the United States;
(3) to furnish to persons subject to this title such technical assistance as they may request
to further their compliance with this title or an order issued thereunder;
(4) upon request of (i) any employer, whose employees or some of them, or (ii) any labor
organization, whose members or some of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to cooperate in
effectuating the provisions of this title, to assist in such effectuation by conciliation or such
other remedial action as is provided by this title;
(5) to make such technical studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and
policies of this title and to make the results of such studies available to the public;
(6) to refer matters to the Attorney General with recommendations for intervention in a
civil action brought by an aggrieved party under section 706, or for the institution of a civil
action by the Attorney General under section 707, and to advise, consult, and assist the
Attorney General on such matters.
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 241, 258-59 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4).
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promulgated guidelines requiring employers to accommodate the religious practices
of employees unless such accommodation would create a “serious inconvenience to
the conduct of the business.”13 One year later, the EEOC revised its guidelines
excusing the reasonable accommodation only if the employer could prove an “undue
hardship.”14
The work of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was frustrated
somewhat, in 1970, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., expressed the opinion that the EEOC guidelines were
not consistent with the purposes of the 1964 Act to the extent that they compelled an
employer to accommodate the religious beliefs of another.15 The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit on other grounds, but because the judgment
was entered by an equally divided Court it was not “entitled to precedential
weight.”16 However, the authority of the EEOC was further questioned in Riley v.
Bendix Corp.17 Referencing the fact that the 1967 EEOC guidelines required the
employer to bear the burden of proof in establishing undue hardship, the Riley court
stated the following:
We do not believe that the Commission is vested with the authority of
determining the procedural question of burden of proof . . . . [W]e feel it
would be unreasonable and impractical to require the complex American
business structure to prove why it cannot gear itself to the ‘varied
religious practices of the American people.’18
Congress immediately responded to the Dewey and Riley opinions by passing the
1972 amendment to Title VII which incorporated the 1967 EEOC guidelines
excusing “reasonable accommodations” in the face of “undue hardship.”19
Although “undue hardship” is the standard on which employer compliance
hinges, the standard went undefined in the 1972 amendment. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court shaped the Title VII landscape by its decisions.
The seminal decision in Title VII religious discrimination litigation is Trans
World Airlines v. Hardison.20 In Hardison, the Court held that an “undue hardship”
exists if an employer is required to bear more than a de minimis cost to provide a

13

Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1966).

14

Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(2) (1967).

15

429 F.2d 324, 331 n.1 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971). The Sixth Circuit actually held, in part, that the employer had made a reasonable
accommodation by allowing the employee to obtain a replacement for his shift, thus making it
possible for him to observe a Sunday Sabbath. Id. at 331.
16

Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972).

17

330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971).

18

Id. at 588-89.

19

See 118 CONG. REC. 705-31 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1972); see also supra note 7.

20

432 U.S. 63 (1977).
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reasonable accommodation.21 Displeasure with the Court’s low de minimis standard
was immediate as Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote in dissent:
[The] decision deals a fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to
accommodate work requirements to religious practices. The Court holds,
in essence, that although the EEOC regulations and the Act state that an
employer must make reasonable adjustments in his work demands to take
account of religious observances, the regulation and Act do not really
mean what they say.22
Essentially, many feel that the Court’s decision did nothing more than invalidate and
ignore the intent of the Act and trivialize protections offered to religiously-dedicated
employees.23
Nearly ten years after Hardison, the Supreme Court again narrowed the scope of
the employer’s duty under Title VII in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook.24 In
Philbrook, the Court reversed a portion of a decision of the United States Court of
21

Id. at 84. Hardison was a clerk in the Stores Department at TWA who sought Saturdays
off in order to observe the Sabbath of his chosen religion—the Worldwide Church of God. Id.
at 66-67. After participating in a temporary “shift swap,” Hardison received an intra-company
transfer, but, as a result, lost seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement which
had previously allowed him to bid for, and easily obtain, Saturday-free shifts. Id. at 68.
Hardison was eventually discharged for insubordination after refusing to show up for
scheduled Saturday shifts. Id. at 68-69.
In reaching its decision, the Court was adamant about protecting the integrity of the
collective bargaining agreement in place at TWA. Id. at 81. The Court stated that:
It would be anomalous to conclude that by “reasonable accommodation” Congress
meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employees, as
well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the
religious needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII does not require an employer
to go that far. Id.
22

Id. at 86-87.

23

See Alan D. Schuchman, The Holy and the Handicapped: An Examination of the
Different Applications of the Reasonable Accommodation Clauses in Title VII and the ADA,
73 IND. L.J. 745, 761 (1998) (suggesting that by setting the de minimis standard, the Hardison
Court “read the adjective ‘undue’ out of the Act.”); see also Sonny Franklin Miller, Religious
Accommodation Under Title VII: The Burdenless Burden, 22 J. CORP. L. 789, 799 (1997)
(suggesting that “undue hardship” analysis in religious accommodation claims amounts to
nothing more than a “hypothetical protection”).
24

479 U.S. 60 (1986). Philbrook was a high school teacher in Ansonia, Connecticut, and,
as a member of the Worldwide Church of God, missed approximately six school days per year
for observance of religious holy days. Id. at 62-63. Under the collective bargaining
agreement between the Board and teacher’s union, three days of paid leave was annually
provided for observance of mandatory religious holidays. Id. at 63-64. An additional three
days could be taken for “necessary personal business,” but this was understood not to include
religious observance. Id.
For a time, Philbrook used “personal” days for religious purposes and his pay was
accordingly reduced for such unauthorized leave. Id. at 64-65. While indicating that the
school board policy requiring Philbrook to take unpaid leave for holy day observance was
probably reasonable, the Court remanded the case for factual findings on whether paid leave
was provided for all purposes except religious ones. Id. at 70-71.
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Appeals for the Second Circuit that an employer must choose the reasonable
accommodation that is preferred by, and most beneficial to, the employee.25 In its
opinion, the Court clarified that “where the employer has already reasonably
accommodated the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end . . .
[and] the employer need not further show that each of the employee’s alternative
accommodations would result in undue hardship.”26 Again, as he had done in
Hardison, Justice Marshall led the charge in dissent, expounding that an employer’s
duty to accommodate should include consideration of the employee’s proposals if the
employer is unable to fully resolve the conflict with his own proposals.27
Characteristic of its early involvement in Title VII affairs, the EEOC enacted
aggressive guidelines in response to both the Hardison and Philbrook decisions.
Although the EEOC held the line on the de minimis threshold in terms of “undue
hardship,” it factored into the equation “the identifiable cost in relation to the size
and operating cost of the employer, and the number of individuals who will . . . need
a particular accommodation.”28 Likewise, the guidelines mandate that employers
implement the accommodation which least disadvantages the employee, in those
cases where multiple accommodations exist which would not cause undue
hardship.29 Still, because EEOC guidelines are sometimes not accorded great weight
in Court decisions,30 the most effective way to “restore . . . the original intent of
Title VII’s protections for religious observances and practices,” is through
legislation.31
However, any governmental undertaking promoting affirmative action in the
name of religion must first be found to be constitutionally “pure,” for the First
Amendment espouses the principle that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .”32 By its very nature, Title VII warrants criticism as a
law “establishing religion” because it requires private employers to accommodate,
and arguably to provide preferential treatment for, religious observers.33 As one
commentator has suggested, “the statute . . . clearly has the nonsecular objective of

25

Id. at 68-69.

26

Id. at 68.

27

Id. at 72-73.

28

29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (1996).

29

29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (1998); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(2)(ii) (1996).

30

See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69 n.6 (noting that EEOC guidelines are properly accorded
less weight than administrative regulations declared by Congress to have the force of law).
31

To Amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to Establish Provisions With
Respect to Religious Accommodation in Employment, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on S.
1124 Before the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources United States Senate, 105th Cong. 1
(1997) [hereinafter Hearings] (opening statement of Senator Coats).
32

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

33

See 1 BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
225 (Paul W. Cane Jr. ed., American Bar Ass’n 3d. ed. 1996).
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improving the employment position of religious employees, rather than improving
the status of all employees, religious or nonreligious.”34
Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court of the United States, as a whole, has had
little to say definitively regarding the constitutionality of Title VII’s “reasonable
accommodations” provision. Nevertheless, lower courts and individual Supreme
Court members have commented on the subject sparingly. Interpreting the
significance of what each has said necessitates an inquiry into Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
III. TITLE VII AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The fundamental test employed in Establishment Clause challenges was fleshed
out by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.35 In Lemon, the Court held that
two state statutes36 violated the Establishment Clause because they provided state aid
to church-related elementary and secondary schools, in part, by reimbursing the cost
for teachers’ salaries and secular textbooks.37 The Lemon Court determined that in
order for a statute to remain consistent with the Establishment Clause, it must
comply with each of the following: 1) the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; 2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; and 3) the statute must not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion.38 While the Court found that both state statutes complied with the first two
prongs of the test, it held that continual monitoring of teacher performance and
method—so as to ensure that religious tenets were not being blended into secular
subjects—would involve excessive entanglement between church and state.39
The Lemon test figured prominently in one of the earliest challenges to Title
VII’s “reasonable accommodations” provision—Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.40
Cummins was an employee who was fired for refusing to work on Saturday, which
was the Sabbath of his chosen religion of the Worldwide Church of God.41 In
34

Ronald W. Eades, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—An Unconstitutional Attempt
to Establish Religion, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 72 (1980); see also Cummins v. Parker Seal
Co., 516 F.2d 544, 558 (6th 1975) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (stating, in part, that the
religious accommodation requirement of Title VII discriminates between religion and nonreligion), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
35

403 U.S. 602 (1971).

36

The statutes in question were the products of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
legislatures. Id. at 606.
37

Id.

38

Id. at 612-13.

39

403 U.S. at 613-19.

40

516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976),
judgment vacated by 433 U.S. 903 (1977). Note that the Sixth Circuit in Cummins actually
cites Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), for its Establishment
Clause test, but the test is unquestionably the one that evolved from Lemon. See 516 F.2d at
551-52.
41

516 F.2d at 545. Cummins filed a charge of religious discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and a complaint with the Kentucky
Commission on Human Rights (KCHR). Id. The KCHR originally found that the employer’s
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passing on the constitutionality of Title VII, the Sixth Circuit held that Title VII had
the adequate secular purpose of preventing discrimination in employment.42
Comparing Title VII to the statute allowing conscientious objector exemption, the
court stated that “the reasonable accommodation rule reflects a legislative judgment
that . . . certain persons will not compromise their religious convictions and that they
should not be punished for the supremacy of conscience.”43 With regard to the
second prong of the test, the court held that Title VII neither advanced nor inhibited
religion, in part, because it did not mandate financial support for religious
institutions.44 Furthermore, the court stated that according to the Supreme Court, “a
law is not necessarily unconstitutional merely because it confers incidental or
indirect benefits upon religious institutions.”45 Finally, the court did not find
excessive entanglement fostered by Title VII because it required little or no contact
between religious institutions and governmental entities.46 The court emphasized:
“[T]he EEOC and the courts will have to determine simply whether the employer has
made a reasonable accommodation and whether an undue hardship will result. These
issues will be considered in the labor relations context, and their resolution certainly
does not necessitate any governmental entanglement with religion.”47
Although the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the Sixth Circuit, it did so
by an equally divided Court.48 In addition, the Supreme Court later vacated the
judgment and remanded in light of its decision in Hardison.49 Based on the
Hardison decision, the Sixth Circuit, on remand, affirmed the original decision of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky and dismissed
Cummins’s complaint.50 Thus, Title VII’s constitutional status remanded in limbo.
attempts to accommodate Cummins’s religious needs resulted in undue hardship to the
employer and it dismissed the complaint. Id. at 545-46. Cummins subsequently filed an
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. Id. Based on
the factual record developed before the KCHR, the district court held that the employer was
justified in discharging Cummins and it dismissed the complaint. Id. at 546. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court, finding
no substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that making the
accommodation would cause undue hardship. 516 F.2d at 550. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit
dispensed with a constitutional challenge to Title VII’s “reasonable accommodations”
requirement, holding that it did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 552-53.
42
Id. at 552. The Sixth Circuit relied on the remarks of Senator Randolph, the sponsor of
the 1972 Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that it was his desire “to assure that
freedom from religious discrimination in the employment of workers [was] for all time
guaranteed by law.” Id. (citing 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972)).
43

Id. at 552-53.

44

Id. at 553.

45

Id. (citation omitted).

46

Cummins, 516 F.2d at 553.

47

Id. at 553-54.

48

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.

49

Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).

50

Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 561 F.2d 658-59 (6th Cir. 1977).
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Still, over the next ten years, several Supreme Court Justices hinted at the
constitutionality of Title VII’s “reasonable accommodations” feature. For instance,
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, stated outright that “I think it beyond
dispute that [Title VII] does and, consistently with the First Amendment, can require
employers to grant privileges to religious observers as part of the accommodation
process.”51 Additionally, Marshall expressed the view that “the mere fact that the
law sometimes requires special treatment of religious practitioners does not present
the dangers of ‘sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity’ against which the Establishment Clause is principally
aimed.”52 Similarly, Justice O’Connor subsequently explained:
[A] statute outlawing employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin has the valid secular purpose of assuring
employment opportunity to all groups in our pluralistic society. Since
Title VII calls for reasonable rather than absolute accommodation and
extends that requirement to all religious beliefs and practices rather than
protecting only the Sabbath observance . . . an objective observer would
perceive it as an anti-discrimination law rather than an endorsement of
religion or a particular religious practice.53
The “absolute accommodation,” from which Justice O’Connor tried to
distinguish Title VII, was a standard the Court reviewed in Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.54
Thornton involved a Connecticut statute that prohibited an employer from requiring
an employee to work on a day of the week that the employee observed as his chosen
Sabbath.55 Resorting to the Lemon test, the Court held that the statute violated the
Establishment Clause because it created an “unyielding weighting in favor of
Sabbath observers over all other interests”56 and, thus, went “beyond having an
incidental or remote effect of advancing religion.”57 The Court placed particular
emphasis on the manner in which the statute mandated that religious interests control
over the secular interests of the workplace and on the fact that the statute lacked
exceptions; for example, the statute gave no consideration to the burdens placed on
the employer or co-employees or to whether the employer had proposed any
reasonable accommodations.58

51

Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 91 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

52

Id. at 92 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668
(1970)).
53

Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

54

Id. at 703.

55

Id. at 704-05.

56

Id. at 710.

57

Id.

58

472 U.S. at 709-10.
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Thus, in addition to Cummins, and a group of other lower court decisions
upholding the constitutionality of Title VII’s “reasonable accommodations,”59 the
Thornton decision, and especially O’Connor’s concurring opinion, seemed to
solidify the otherwise precarious Establishment Clause ground on which Title VII
stood.60 Specifically, it delineated the dichotomy of permissible and impermissible
accommodations for religion: reasonable, but not absolute. One scholar noted the
dichotomy while calling for and proposing changes to Title VII:
[B]arring a requirement of absolute accommodation . . . a standard more
protective of employees than the de minimis standard would not seem to
violate the Establishment Clause. The Court could have measured undue
hardship against a reasonable-costs standard or arguably even against a
significant-expense standard, like that of the ADA, and still met the
requirements of the Lemon test.61
IV. THE WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
In 1997, Congress introduced an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e entitled the
Workplace Religious Freedom Act (WRFA).62 In general, the WRFA proposed the
59
See McDaniel v. Essex Int’l, Inc., 696 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1982); Nottelson v. Smith Steel
Workers D.A.L.U., 643 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1981); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d
1239 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098.
60

See Protos v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 797 F.2d 129 (3d. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 972; EEOC v. Jefferson-Smurfit Corp., 724 F. Supp. 881 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
61
Schuchman, supra note 23, at 758-59; see also Miller, supra note 23, at 791 (proposing
that incorporation of the 1996 EEOC guidelines into Title VII, taking into account “the
identifiable cost in relation to the size and operating cost of the employer” and “the number of
individuals needing the accommodation” would be constitutional in the face of Establishment
Clause scrutiny).
62

See supra notes 5-6. The text of S. 1124, 105th Cong. (1997), is as follows:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the “Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 1997.”
SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS.
(a) DEFINITIONS—Section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e(j)) is amended—
(1) by inserting “(1)” after “(j)” ;
(2) by inserting “, after initiating and engaging in an affirmative and bona
fide effort,” after “unable”;
(3) by striking “an employee’s” and all that follows through “religious”
and insert “an employee’s religious”; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
“(2) As used in this subsection, the term ‘employee’ includes a prospective
employee.
“(3) As used in this subsection, the term ‘undue hardship’ means an accommodation
requiring significant difficulty or expense. For purposes of determining whether an
accommodation requires significant difficulty or expense—
“(A) an accommodation shall be considered to require significant
difficulty or expense if the accommodation will result in the inability
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of an employee to perform the essential functions of the employment position of
the employee; and
“(B) other factors to be considered in making the determination shall
include—
“(i) the identifiable cost of the accommodation, including
the costs of loss of productivity and of retraining or hiring employees or
transferring employees from one facility to another, in relation to the
size and operating cost of the employer;
“(ii) the number of individuals who will need the particular
accommodation to a religious observance or practice; and
“(iii) for an employer with multiple facilities, the degree
to which the geographic separateness or administrative or fiscal relationship of
the facilities will make the accommodation more difficult or expensive.”
(b) EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES—Section 703 of such Act (42 U.S.C 2000e-2) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
“(o)(1) As used in this subsection:
“(A) The term ‘employee’ includes a prospective employee.
“(B) The term ‘leave of general usage’ means leave provided under
the policy or program of an employer, under which
“(i) an employee may take leave by adjusting or altering
the work schedule or assignment of the employee according to criteria
determined by the employer; and
“(ii) the employee may determine the purpose for which
the leave is to be utilized.
“(C) The term ‘undue hardship’ has the meaning given the term in
section 701(j)(3).
“(2) For purposes of determining whether an employer has committed an
unlawful employment practice under this title by failing to provide a reasonable
accommodation to the religious observance or practice of an employee, an
accommodation by the employer shall not be deemed to be reasonable if
such accommodation does not remove the conflict between employment requirements
and the religious observance or practice of the employee.
“(3) An employer shall be considered to commit such a practice by failing to
provide such a reasonable accommodation for an employee if the employer
refuses to permit the employee to utilize leave of general usage to remove such
a conflict solely because the leave will be used to accommodate the religious
observance or practice of the employee.
“(4)It shall not be a defense to a claim of unlawful employment practice under
this title for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation to a religious
observance or practice of an employee that such accommodation would be in
violation of a bona fide seniority system if, in order for the employer to
reasonably accommodate such observance or practice —
“(A) an adjustment would be made in the employee’s work hours
(including an adjustment that requires the employee to work overtime in order to
avoid working at a time that abstention from work is necessary to satisfy religious
requirements), shift, or job assignment, that would not be available to any employee
but for such accommodation; or
“(B) the employee and any other employee would voluntarily
exchange shifts or job assignments, or voluntarily make some other arrangement
between the employees.
“(5)(A) An employer shall not be required to pay premium wages or confer
premium benefits for work performed during hours to which such premium wages or premium
benefits would ordinarily be applicable, if work is performed during such hours only to
accommodate religious requirements of an employee.
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following changes to Title VII: 1) defining “undue hardship” to mean an
accommodation requiring “significant difficulty or expense,” thus adopting the
Americans with Disabilities Act definition and effectively nullifying the Supreme
Court’s de minimis standard established in Hardison; 2) determining if “significant
difficulty or expense” exists based on if the accommodation results in the inability of
an employee to perform the essential functions of the employment position and also
by considering the identifiable cost to the employer, the number of individuals
needing the particular accommodation, and any added difficulty that would be
involved by the geographic separateness or administrative or fiscal relationship of
multiple work facilities; (3) requiring that for an accommodation to be considered
“reasonable” the employer must remove the conflict between employment
requirements and the religious observance or practice of the employee; (4)
prohibiting an employer from preventing an employee from utilizing “general leave”
to accommodate the employee’s religious observance, thus clarifying a similar
scenario discussed in Philbrook; (5) prohibiting an employer from using as a defense
the claim that an accommodation would violate a bona fide seniority system if an
adjustment would be made in the employee’s work hours, shift, or job assignment
(that would not be available to any employee but for such accommodation), or if the
employees could make voluntary arrangements for shift or job swaps.63
In co-sponsoring the legislation, Senator Kerry of Massachusetts articulated that
“the Workplace Religious Freedom Act represents our effort to try to create the
proper balance between [Government prohibitions against] establishment of religion
[and] . . . the curtailing of religious observances.”64 Unfortunately, the good Senator
may have contributed to tipping Title VII’s scales too far in favor of establishment,
prompting one person to testify before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources that “the severest test for [The Workplace Religious Freedom Act] will be
the Constitution and not particular quibbles about the statutory language.”65
Notwithstanding indications that existing Title VII formulations are constitutional,66
“(B) As used in this paragraph—
“(i) the term ‘premium benefit’ means an employment benefit, such as
seniority, group life insurance, health insurance, disability insurance, sick
leave, annual leave, an educational benefit, or a pension, that is greater than
the employment benefit due the regular work schedule of the employee; and
“(ii) the term ‘premium wages’ includes overtime pay and
compensatory time off, premium pay for night, weekend, or holiday work, and
premium pay for standby or irregular duty.”
SECTION 3, EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS
(a) EFFECTIVE DATE—Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act and the
amendments made by Section 2 take effect on the date of enactment of this Act.
(b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS -- The amendments made by Section 2 do
not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of enactment of this Act.
63

See supra note 62.

64

Hearings, supra note 31, at 2-3 (statement of Senator Kerry from Massachusetts).

65

Id. at 65-66 (statement of Roberto L. Corrada, Professor, University of Denver College
of Law, Denver, Co.).
66

See supra text accompanying notes 32-61; see also Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the
Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitutional Litigation, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1317,
1357 (1997) (suggesting that current Title VII would be constitutional based on general
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this author submits that any future amendment to Title VII resembling the proposed
Workplace Religious Freedom Act faces serious challenges on Establishment Clause
grounds, either under the Lemon test or revisions of the Lemon test emphasizing
“neutrality,”67 “endorsement,”68 or “coercion.”69
V. THE WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT: NOTHING BUT A “LEMON”
Assuming that, as an anti-discrimination law, Title VII has a valid secular
purpose, the WRFA passes muster under the first prong of the Lemon test.
Assuming further that over thirty years of court interpretation of Title VII claims has
been achieved without significant difficulty, the courts are not likely to become
excessively entangled if the WRFA is enacted. However, there is a strong possibility
that the WRFA could be struck down under Lemon’s second prong because it has the
effect of advancing religion.
A. “Advancing Religion”
1. De Minimis Is the Maximum
Conceptually, the low de minimis threshold stands as a monument to the Court’s
desire to avoid Establishment Clause implications altogether in the Title VII arena,70
and evidences a nonverbal warning that a higher threshold would constitutionally
destroy an otherwise socially beneficial law. Even Justices Marshall and Brennan,
who generally gave Title VII (in its current form) a passing constitutional grade,71
and who criticized the Hardison majority for setting the de minimis standard, hinted
that “important constitutional questions would be posed by interpreting [Title VII] to
compel employers (or fellow employees) to incur substantial costs to aid the
religious observer . . . .”72

Supreme Court doctrines permitting the Government to take action tailored to protect
individual religious freedom).
67

See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696
(1994). Professor Corrada, of the University of Denver College of Law, actually commented
before the Senate that if the Workplace Religious Freedom Act were an individual piece of
legislation, it would clearly be held unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds.
Hearings, supra note 31, at 66. However, he felt that as an amendment to Title VII, it would
survive because Title VII, as an anti-discrimination law, has a valid secular purpose. Id. It is
this author’s opinion that, regardless of its secular purpose, WRFA faces severe challenges
under the second prong of the Lemon test.
68

See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

69

See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).

70

See Schuchman, supra note 23, at 758; see also 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note
33, at 231; Hearings, supra note 31, at 58 (statement of Lawrence Z. Lorber, employment
discrimination lawyer with Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand, Washington,
D.C.) (commenting, respectively, that the Court set a low de minimis standard to avoid any
Establishment Clause conflicts).
71

See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.

72

Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90-91 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Marshall also explicitly stated that he was not deciding the merits of any constitutional
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Clearly, the “significant difficulty or expense” threshold, proposed in an
amendment like the WRFA, would awaken the “sleeping Establishment Clause dog”
that the Hardison Court preferred to let lie. An analogy to the Court’s decision in
Thornton illustrates how this would occur.73 One commentator has noted the
following: “Thornton hints at [a] difficulty with the statutory ‘reasonable
accommodation’ requirement. The Court’s opinion emphasized the burdens that
Connecticut’s statute placed on employees and coworkers. That is, accommodation
in this context pits religious interests against economic ones.”74 While the de
minimis interpretation of existing Title VII substantially reduces the degree to which
Congress, and the government in general, is seen to have subordinated economic
interests to religious ones,75 the “significant burden or expense” threshold proposed
boosts religious interests greatly above those of secular economic concerns by
forcing employers to incur greater costs to accommodate religiously-dedicated
employees. In other words, the enhanced standard would vault Title VII past the
acceptable point of merely conferring an “incidental” or “indirect” benefit on
religion.76
2. “Reasonable,” Unreasonably Advanced, Approaches “Absolute”
Elements of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act requiring an employer to
“initiate . . . an affirmative and bona fide effort” to provide an accommodation77 and
to completely “remove the conflict” between employment requirements and the
employee’s religious observance78 threaten to transform the “reasonable”
accommodations concept into a type of “absolute” accommodation.79 Knowing,
based on Thornton, that the Court would not view favorably any type of “absolute”
threshold,80 there are two ways in which an explicit mandate to “remove the conflict”
too closely resembles an “absolute” accommodation. First, the WRFA distorts the
meaning of “accommodation.” Second, the WRFA forces the employer into
acquiescing to and implementing employee-proposed accommodations.

objections that could be raised if Title VII were construed to require employers to assume
significant costs in accommodating. Id. at 91 n.3.
73

See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.

74

Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76
GEO. L.J. 1691, 1707 (1988).
75

Id.

76

See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.

77

See S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(2) (1997); see also supra note 62 (setting forth the full
text of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act).
78

See S. 1124 § 2(b)(2); see also supra note 62 (setting forth the full text of the Workplace
Religious Freedom Act).
79
See Hearings, supra note 31, at 49 (statement of Lawrence Z. Lorber, employment
discrimination lawyer with Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand, Washington,
D.C.) (suggesting that removing the conflict resembles an absolute standard).
80

See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.
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a. “You Mean ‘Accommodation’ as in ‘Compromise’ . . . Right?”
Despite arguments by proponents of WRFA that “a reasonable accommodation
has got to be an accommodation that lifts the conflict completely . . . or it is no
accommodation at all;”81 such arguments distort the meaning of the word
“accommodation,” connoting unilateral sacrifice on the part of the employer rather
than mutual compromise by both parties.82 Contrary to the articulation of Justice
Stevens that when a duty to accommodate arises, the employer has a statutory duty to
remove the conflict,83 the courts have recognized that a “reasonable” accommodation
can be, and often is, made short of complete conflict removal. For example, in
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., the Sixth Circuit held that an employer had made a
reasonable accommodation for a Sunday Sabbatarian through a neutral policy of
allowing him the opportunity to secure a replacement for his Sunday shift.84 The
Dewey decision reflects the true nature of an “accommodation” as both parties
shared the burden of conflict: the employer compromised by allowing the employee
to seek a replacement, and the employee compromised by assuming the duty to find
a replacement.
Conversely, under the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, it seems that if the
employee was forced to share in the burden of conflict resolution, that a Dewey
accommodation might not even qualify for consideration as “reasonable.” Rather,
the employer might have to allow for an employee replacement and also attempt to
secure that replacement. Critics of the foregoing argument could point to the WRFA
provision allowing for, and encouraging, voluntary job/shift swaps arranged by
employees themselves.85 But such critics can be answered on two counts. First, if
WRFA intends for the employee to share in the removal of conflict, then language
mandating that the employer “remove the conflict” is contradictory, unnecessary,
and superfluous. Second, the aforementioned voluntary job/shift swap allowance
falls under a provision prohibiting employers from upholding an otherwise valid
collective bargaining agreement which might not favor such swaps.86 Thus, WRFA
constructively pushes “reasonable” into the realm of “absolute” by stripping the
employer of discretion in business decisionmaking and, similar to the statute at issue
in Thornton, forces the employer to “adjust [his] affairs to the command of the
[Government] whenever the statute is invoked by the employee.”87 One practitioner
81
Hearings, supra note 31, at 66 (comment of Roberto L. Corrada, Professor, University of
Denver College of Law, Denver, Co.).
82
In common parlance, “accommodation” is understood as being synonymous with
“compromise.” See ROGET’S 21ST CENTURY THESAURUS 165 (1992). “To compromise”
means “to bind by mutual agreement” or “to adjust or settle by partial mutual relinquishment
of principles, position, or claims.” See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 468
(1971)(emphasis added).
83

Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 76 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).

84

429 F.2d 325 (6th. Cir. 1970), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).

85

See S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(4)(B) (1997); see also supra note 62 (setting forth the
full text of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act).
86

See S. 1124 § 2(b)(4)(B).

87

Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985) (emphasis added).
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put it best when he testified before the Senate that “the essential concept of an
‘accommodation’ is for a means to be found to allow the co-existence of competing
interests—not the elimination of either; [t]o eliminate the conflict means that the
requested accommodation becomes a non-negotiable order.”88
Of course, it is undisputed that Title VII, by requiring an accommodation at all,
gives to employers a non-negotiable order. However, the matter of degree is the
important issue here, which, again, is what the Supreme Court implicitly said in
Hardison. The more non-negotiable orders that an amendment like WRFA is seen to
give employers in the name of religion, the more Title VII gets pushed toward an
“absolute” burden—a constitutionally unacceptable degree.
Because the Supreme Court was equally divided in affirming Dewey, it attempted
to solidify the concept of “accommodation” in Philbrook, considering an
accommodation to be “reasonable” that would have required an employee to take
unpaid leave for holy day observance.89 Clearly, an accommodation allowing unpaid
leave does not technically remove the conflict completely because the employee
must still forfeit a portion of his salary for the time off.90 Nevertheless, it “eliminates
the conflict”91 to the extent that it signifies a mutual compromise: one in which the
employer allows the employee to freely observe his holy days without threat of job
loss or discipline, and the employee rightly gives up compensation for a day he does
not work.92
Additionally, the accommodation of “mutual” compromise93—one not always
requiring complete conflict removal to the extent that the employee is burden-free—
is the concept that the Court prefers. In Philbrook, the Court referenced the
legislative history of the 1972 amendment to Title VII, adopting the view of its
sponsor, Senator Randolph, that accommodations be made with “flexibility” and “a
desire to achieve an adjustment.”94 Likewise, the Court noted a decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in which it was stated that
“bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the search for an acceptable reconciliation of
the needs of the employee’s religion and the exigencies of the employer’s
business.”95 Unfortunately, the strong, explicit language of the WRFA requiring that
an employer “initiate . . . an affirmative and bona fide effort” to provide an
accommodation which, to be reasonable, must “remove the conflict,” threatens to
88

Hearings, supra note 31, at 49 (statement of Lawrence Z. Lorber, employment
discrimination lawyer with Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand, Washington,
D.C.).
89

Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70 (1986).

90

Id. at 74 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

91

Id. at 70.

92
Id. The majority and dissenting opinions highlight the ambiguities inherent in the term
“eliminate the conflict;” accordingly, I feel that any such language included in WRFA has the
potential to be misinterpreted and will disproportionately burden the employer in the
accommodation process.
93

See supra note 82.

94

Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 706 (1972)).

95

Id. (quoting Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr. Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145-46 (1982)).
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nullify a spirit of “bilateral cooperation” and impose a system of unilateral employer
sacrifice.96 Thus, the WRFA approaches the precipice of “religious advancement.”
b. “Why Don’t You Just Tell Me Exactly What You Want!”
The unilateralism of the obligation under the Workplace Religious Freedom Act
is further evidenced by a reading of “removing the conflict” that requires the
employer to implement the reasonable accommodation most beneficial to the
employee; after all, some might argue that the conflict is not completely removed if
the employee is denied the opportunity to have his burden reduced by actually
selecting the accommodation. Such an intention is supported by two factors. First,
Senate Version One of the WRFA included a subsection (separate from the
subsection on “conflict removal” but incorporated into the same section on
reasonable accommodation analysis) actually stating that an accommodation would
not be considered “reasonable” if “the employee demonstrates to the employer the
availability of an alternative accommodation less onerous to the employee that may
be made by the employer without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.”97 Second, the WRFA was introduced to “remedy decisions that have been
made by the courts over a series of years that . . . have strayed from the original
intent of Title VII.”98 In Philbrook, the Court rejected a system under which the
most “employee-beneficial” accommodation would have to be implemented.99
Because the WRFA already clarifies the Philbrook decision in one other respect by
ensuring that employees be permitted to use general leave to accommodate religious
practices,100 it is not unreasonable to conclude that the WRFA would seek to alter
Philbrook with regard to employee-preferred accommodations. Accordingly, the
final version of the WRFA, if enacted, is likely to include—either explicitly or
subsumed into the duty of “conflict removal”—a requirement that an employer
implement the reasonable accommodation preferred by the employee.
A requirement forcing the employer to implement the reasonable accommodation
preferred by the employee slides the WRFA toward an “absolute” accommodation
constitutionally forbidden under Lemon. For example, just as the Connecticut statute
in Thornton gave the employee the power to unilaterally designate the Sabbath day
for which he would be relieved of work,101 the WRFA would effectively give the
employee the power to unilaterally designate which accommodation the employer
will implement. In other words, by placing power in the hands of the employee to
propose and implement his own reasonable accommodation—one that is less
onerous than the employer’s accommodation and which does not create an undue
hardship—the WRFA theoretically nullifies the efforts of the employer, giving little,

96

See supra notes 77-78; see also supra note 62 (setting forth the full text of the
Workplace Religious Freedom Act).
97

S. 92, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(2)(B)(i) (1997).

98

Hearings, supra note 31, at 2 (opening statement by Senator Coats).

99

Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68-69.

100

See supra note 24; see also S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (1997); see also supra note
62 (setting forth the full text of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act).
101

Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985).
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if any, consideration to his reasonable accommodations, and, yet again, stripping him
of all discretion in business decisionmaking.102
Of course, the aforementioned argument must be annotated with the fact that the
Court in Philbrook never referenced its Thornton decision of the previous year; the
Philbrook Court found forced adoption of employee-preferred accommodations to be
explicitly offensive to the plain meaning and legislative history of the 1972
amendment to Title VII rather than addressing any potential offensiveness to the
Establishment Clause for “advancement” of religious principles.103 However, this
author believes that language employed by the Court in Philbrook supports the small
leap into a Lemon analysis of the kind conducted in Thornton. In Philbrook, the
Court described a system in which the employer would be forced to select the
accommodation preferred by the employee as a system in which “the employee is
given every incentive to hold out for the most beneficial accommodation, despite the
fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution to the conflict.”104 This language
can be directly reconciled with the concern of the Court in Thornton, and the idea
previously illustrated in this note, that the more control that is given to the employee
in the accommodation process, the less consideration is given to employer proposals,
and the more the employer is “held hostage”—backed into a situation of
acquiescence to the “unilateral” dictates of the religiously-minded employee.105
Thus, the slippery slope of “absolute” accommodation begins, leading to
disproportionate “advancement” of religious interests under the Lemon test.
c. “‘Absolute’ Means No Exceptions; the WRFA Has One . . . Does It Not?”
A strong argument can be advanced that the Workplace Religious Freedom Act
does not force an “absolute” standard on employers because, regardless of whether
the employer must present accommodations that “remove the conflict” or whether
the employer must implement the accommodation preferred by the employee, the
employer can still acquire exemption from accommodating in the face of “undue
hardship.”106 The problem with this argument is that, in addition to raising “undue
hardship” to a level requiring “significant difficulty or expense,” the WRFA offers
an ill-designed, “two-tiered” determination for what constitutes “significant
difficulty or expense”—the first tier of which denies that “significant difficulty or
expense” exists short of any accommodation making the employee unable to perform
the essential functions of his position.107 By so providing, Congress inadvertently
102

In Thornton, the Court commented that the Connecticut statute “[allowed] for no
consideration as to whether the employer [had] made reasonable accommodation proposals.”
Id. at 710.
103

See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68-69.

104

Id. at 69 (emphasis added).

105

See text accompanying supra notes 101-102.

106
Hearings, supra note 31, at 56 (statement of Roberto L. Corrada, Professor, University
of Denver College of Law, Denver, Co.).
107

I consider “tiers” one and two to consist of (A) and (B), respectively, of the following:

(A) an accommodation shall be considered to require significant difficulty or
expense if the accommodation will result in the inability of an employee to perform the
essential functions of the employment position of the employee; and
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created a ridiculous and nearly impossible exemption for employers to obtain in
certain situations. For instance, “tier one” implies that any leave of absence (the
accommodation contemplated in Hardison) offered to an employee would be an
“undue hardship” because during leave the employee could not perform any of the
functions of his position; if this were true, an employer would always be excused
from accommodating, thus nullifying the WRFA’s consideration of job swaps and
transfers108 and undermining the entire purpose of the WRFA in making it more
difficult for employers to escape their duty to accommodate for religiously-dedicated
employees.
Accordingly, for the WRFA to work, one must assume that the aforementioned
paradox is not intended.
But then how is an employer to know what
accommodations create the “significant difficulty or expense” contemplated in “tier
one?” (i.e., if leave of absence does not, than what does?) Senator Coats indicated
that job swaps are a part of the analysis and suggested that “if the employer can show
that, say, this machinist performs this work, and the job swap that has been proposed
or arranged involves someone not trained in that technicality, that is a defense for the
employer.”109 Although the comment by Senator Coats appears to clear the air,
consider this dilemma: Is the “arranged” job swap “voluntary” as contemplated
elsewhere in the WRFA,110 or is it “employer-directed” as connoted in “tier two,”
which contemplates the “cost . . . of retraining or hiring employees or transferring
employees from one facility to another.”111 To even hint at the latter is to seriously
impact coworkers in order to accommodate religion, undoubtedly a serious
Establishment Clause concern in terms of advancing religion above other secular
interests. Admittedly, some of the WRFA hearings indicate that the former of the
two options is likely intended.112 Yet, even if transfers and swaps are voluntarily
arranged, the employer is still being mandated to violate a bona fide seniority system
in order to allow them; this too presents a serious Establishment Clause concern —
one that will be discussed in greater depth in the next section.
(B) other factors to be considered in making the determination shall include –
(i) the identifiable cost of the accommodation, including the costs of loss
of productivity and of retraining or hiring employees or transferring employees from one
facility to another, in relation to the size and operating cost of the employer;
(ii) the number of individuals who will need the particular accommodation
to a religious observance or practice; and
(iii) for an employer with multiple facilities, the degree to which the
geographic separateness or administrative or fiscal relationship of the facilities will make the
accommodation more difficult or expensive.
S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(a)(3)(A)-(B) (1997); see supra note 62 (setting forth the full text
of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act).
108
Hearings, supra note 31, at 48 (statement of Lawrence Z. Lorber, employment
discrimination lawyer with Verner, Liipfert, Bernhard, McPherson & Hand, Washington,
D.C.).
109

Id. at 62 (comment of Senator Coats).

110

See S. 1124 § 2(b)(4); see also supra note 62 (setting forth the full text of the
Workplace Religious Freedom Act).
111

S. 1124 § 2(a)(3)(B)(i) (emphasis added).

112

See Hearings, supra note 31, at 60-64.
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Meanwhile, consider further this scenario: The implication of Senator Coats’s
comment is that as long as an employee is replaced with another who can perform
the same job, the essential functions of the accommodated employee’s position are
still able to be performed and, thus, there is no “significant difficulty or expense.”
Accordingly, if the replacement performs the functions at a lesser rate of productivity
the employer must simply accept that fact under the WRFA. Although “tier two”
contemplates calculation of loss of productivity, the “and” between tiers one and two
suggests that fulfillment of “tier one” is a prerequisite to consideration under “tier
two.” In other words, it is not an “either/or” analysis. Thus, a productivity analysis
would only be conducted if a job swap could not be made or if the essential functions
of the accommodated employee’s position could not be performed. As a result, the
WRFA disproportionately values religious needs over secular concerns by permitting
overall decreases in productivity—something which, over time, will impact coworkers in the form of decreased profits and stagnant wages. In short, just as
opponents of the de minimis standard argued that the Court in Hardison had “read
the adjective ‘undue’ out of [Title VII,]”113 Congress, albeit unintentionally, is
reading the exemption of “undue hardship” out of Title VII altogether. The closer
that Congress comes to accomplishing this blunder, the greater the degree to which
“reasonable” advances to “absolute,” and the closer the WRFA comes to
constitutional slaughter.
3. Seniority: Not What It Used to Be
The Workplace Religious Freedom Act threatens to violate the Establishment
Clause by mandating violations of the bona fide seniority systems of collective
bargaining agreements. In Hardison, the District Court held that the union’s duty to
accommodate Hardison’s religious belief did not require it to ignore its seniority
system.114 In so holding, the District Court expressed concern that if it did not find
violation of a seniority system to constitute an undue hardship, then accommodations
of religious observances might impose “‘a priority of the religious over the secular’ .
. . thereby [raising] significant questions as to the constitutionality of [Title VII]
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”115 While not directly
addressing the Establishment Clause implications, the Supreme Court did agree with
the District Court’s analysis by stating that “we do not believe that the duty to
accommodate requires TWA to take steps inconsistent with the otherwise valid
[collective bargaining] agreement.”116
Nevertheless, the Court supplemented that statement by implying that while it
disfavored mandatory, employer-imposed shift-swapping, which would deprive other
employees of their shift preference, voluntary shift-swapping among employees
might be acceptable.117 Therefore, the WRFA’s command that violation of a bona

113

See Schuchman, supra note 23, at 761 (citation omitted).

114

Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 69 (1977).

115

Id. at 70 n.4 (citations omitted).

116

Id. at 79.

117

The Court stated that “there were no volunteers to relieve Hardison on Saturdays, and to
give Hardison Saturdays off, TWA would have had to deprive another employee of his shift
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fide seniority system may not be a defense to an unlawful employment practice if the
accommodation consisted of voluntary exchanges of shifts or jobs among employees
might withstand scrutiny.118 But, again, as is true of much of constitutional law, the
question is one of degree. What of the WRFA provision that violation of a bona fide
seniority system may not be a defense to a claim of unlawful employment practice if,
in order to make the necessary accommodation, “an adjustment would be made in
the employee’s work hours . . . that would not be available to any employee but for
such accommodation?”119 If hour and shift adjustments are not generally available to
any employee, then this accommodation provides more than an incidental benefit to
religion by breaking the collective bargaining agreement only for religiously-minded
employees.
Theoretically, the answer depends upon whether one characterizes collective
bargaining agreements as purely private contracts or as publicly regulated accords.120
Generally, the Supreme Court has begun to favor accommodations that can be seen
to lift governmentally-imposed burdens on religious practice or on religious
institutions.121 Still, the Establishment Clause concern is much greater, as expressed
by the District Court in Hardison,122 when the burden appears to be privately
imposed. One scholar noted the difficulty of a court interfering with a strictly private
contract:
If the terms of a labor contract serve to make the accord truly private then
there is no government imposed burden that can be said to be lifted by an
accommodation if religious impingement is caused by a substantive term
of the agreement. Thus, the Supreme Court would not have been able to
find a constitutionally viable way to exempt . . . Hardison when he was
compelled to work on the Sabbath by the ostensibly neutral application of
the collective bargaining agreement’s seniority system.123
Thus, if today’s Court chose to defer to the immediately preceding reasoning,
there is a very grave possibility that it would view both a breach of a seniority
system for voluntary job swaps, and a breach for the purpose of altering shift and
hour assignments—not otherwise alterable for employees for nonreligious reasons—

preference at least in part because he did not adhere to a religion that observed the Saturday
Sabbath.” Id. at 81.
118
See S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(4)(B) (1997); see also supra note 62 (setting forth the
full text of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act).
119

S. 1124 § 2(b)(4)(A).

120

See generally Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the National Labor
Relations Act, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 185 (1996) (discussing, generally, the
difference between publicly and privately imposed burdens, the views of the Supreme Court
with regard to accommodations that lift governmentally-imposed burdens, and how collective
bargaining can be viewed as either a publicly or privately imposed burden).
121

Id. at 190.

122

See supra text accompanying note 115.

123

Corrada, supra note 120, at 250.
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as too great a deprivation of the private contractual rights of co-workers and a clearly
unconstitutional “‘[prioritization] of the religious over the secular.’”124
Conversely, if today’s Court were inclined to expand the view that “collective
bargaining . . . lies at the core of our national labor policy,”125 then it would adopt the
view of collective bargaining as a type of governmentally-imposed burden to be
lifted by the Workplace Religious Freedom Act. Consequently, the Court would
scrutinize the WRFA under the analysis set forth in Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, a case in which it
upheld an exemption from Title VII’s religious nondiscrimination requirement for
religious organizations.126 In an opinion authored by Justice White, and joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell, Stevens, and Scalia, the Court
expressed favor for accommodations made to lift governmentally-imposed burdens:
[The Court] has never indicated that statutes that give special
consideration to religious groups are per se invalid. That would run
contrary to the teaching of our cases that there is ample room for
accommodation of religion under the Establishment Clause. Where, as
here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that
burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that the
exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities.127
Although an Amos-tailored analysis would undoubtedly prove favorable to the
collective bargaining provisions of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act, it is
somewhat doubtful that a complete shift in the characterization of collectivebargaining agreements, from purely private to purely public, will occur any time
soon.128 In other words, “the NLRA’s encouragement of collective bargaining,
specifically, should not be used as a shield when the statutory command, as well as
overall Supreme Court interpretation, conceives of these agreements as being private
in nature.”129 Ultimately, it is just as likely as not that the Supreme Court will take a
cautious approach to the WRFA’s interference with fairly-negotiated, neutrally
applied collective bargaining agreements, therefore, finding Establishment Clause
concerns too great to ignore.
VI. A “LEMON” BY ANY OTHER NAME . . .
Since the Lemon decision in 1972, the Court has, from time to time, strayed from
Lemon’s three-pronged analysis, emphasizing that “[n]o per se rule can be framed”130
for Establishment Clause jurisprudence and expressing its “unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.”131 Despite frequent
124

See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

125

Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 70 n.4. (1977).

126

483 U.S. 327 (1987).

127

Id. at 338.

128

See Corrada, supra note 120, at 251.

129

Id. at 252.

130

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1983).

131

Id. at 679.
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departures, however, the Court always seems to come back to the Lemon test for, as
most humorously noted by Justice Scalia, the Lemon test is like a “ghoul in a latenight horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad after being
repeatedly killed and buried. . . .”132
Because the Lemon test figured prominently in both Cummins and Thornton, the
two cases providing the most insight into the Court’s thinking on Title VII’s
“reasonable accommodations,”133 this author believes that the Court will revert to the
use of the Lemon test to analyze any future amendment to Title VII challenged on
Establishment Clause grounds.134 However, this note would be deficient without
discussion of proposed modifications to Lemon,135 as well as its near abandonment
by Justices who have attempted to exorcise that “ghoul” through development of the
“neutrality,” “endorsement,” and “coercion” tests.
A. “Accommodationism” and “Neutrality”
Generally, Amos has been identified as one of the decisions signaling a change in
the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence—away from strict “separationism”
to “accommodationism.”136 The “separationist” view, which gave birth to the Lemon
test, does not favor any form of government aid to religion, while the
“accommodationist” view, as the name implies, is more receptive to governmental
accommodations for religious interests.137 One writer has grouped Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer as “separationists” tending to uphold Establishment
Clause challenges, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas as
“accommodationists” tending to reject Establishment Clause challenges.138 While
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy are somewhat harder to categorize, some feel that
they both swing toward the accommodationist end of the spectrum.139 As will be
shown, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have exerted the greatest influence in
reformulating the Lemon test.
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, Justice
O’Connor suggested that a unitary approach to Establishment Clause jurisprudence
should give way to the application of several, narrower, more precise tests.140 While
132

Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
133

See supra notes 40-58 and accompanying text.

134

As Scalia quipped, “such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least
in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.” Id.
135

See Miller, supra note 23, at 807-13.

136

See generally Id. at 251-52; see also Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 696-97
(1992) (identifying Amos as a recent Supreme Court decision shifting doctrine to
accommodationism).
137

See Miller, supra note 23, at 809-11.

138

See Sedler, supra note 66, at 1337.

139

See generally Corrada, supra note 120, at 251-62.

140

512 U.S. 687, 721 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In Kiryas Joel, the Court held
that a New York statute creating a special school district following the boundaries of the
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stating that abandonment of the Lemon test need not mean abandonment of the
insights reflected in the test, or the case law applying the test, O’Connor felt that,
ultimately, Establishment Clause analysis would benefit if freed from “Lemon’s . . .
rigid influence.”141
Although not commanding a majority in Kiryas Joel, Justices Souter, Blackmun,
Stevens, and Ginsburg caught O’Connor’s wave of change by emphasizing a
“neutrality” test in which the government should neither “favor . . . one religion over
others nor religious adherents collectively over nonadherents.”142 Interestingly
enough, while Blackmun supported the “neutrality” approach, he concurred
separately to make clear that he “[remained] convinced of the general validity of the
basic principles stated in Lemon, which have guided [the] Court’s Establishment
Clause decisions in over 30 cases.”143 Additionally, while expressing doubts about
Lemon, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, lacked
confidence in any existing alternative, stating that “[t]o replace Lemon with nothing
is simply to announce that we are now so bold that we no longer feel the need even
to pretend that our haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed
by any principle.”144 The concurrence of Justice Kennedy did not directly address
Lemon but expressed an air of general favorability for religious accommodation.145
Thus, the overall implication of Kiryas Joel, is as follows: Justices Souter,
Stevens, Ginsburg, and O’Connor are likely to alter or abandon Lemon in the future;
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist are more likely to retain
Lemon. Justice Kennedy, as an “accommodationist” may also support an alternative
to Lemon.146
Realistically, however, the degree of prominence of the “neutrality” test in any
future challenge to a Title VII amendment like the WRFA will bear very little on the
outcome of the case. Actually, the “neutrality” test is extremely similar to Lemon,
prompting one commentator to articulate that it may serve nothing more than to
demonstrate that the second prong of the Lemon test (i.e., that the primary effect of
the statute must neither advance nor inhibit religion) is the most important of the
three prongs.147 Thus, the analysis presented in this note, suggesting possible
Establishment Clause violations under the second prong of Lemon, would not change
much, if at all, under a “neutrality” test.
Village of Kiryas Joel—a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim Jews—violative of the
Establishment Clause because it was “tantamount to an allocation of political power on a
religious criterion and neither presupposes nor requires governmental impartiality toward
religion . . . .” Id. at 690.
141

Id. at 721 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

142

Id. at 696 (citations omitted).

143

Id. at 710-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

144

512 U.S. at 751 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

145

Id. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy did, however, object to the fact
that the New York legislature specifically drew the Kiryas Joel school district along religious
lines. Id. at 729.
146

See Corrada, supra note 120, at 263.

147

See Miller, supra note 23, at 809.
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Furthermore, despite the fact that some believe that an “accommodationist”
majority exists on the Court at this time,148 those accommodationists still believe that
the Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion over others and the
favoring of religion over nonreligion.149 As has been stated throughout, this author
feels that the Workplace Religious Freedom Act disproportionately favors religious
adherents over those who are secularly oriented. Likewise, this author detects a
subtle element in the Workplace Religious Freedom Act by which one or more
religions are potentially favored over others; such is evident in the WRFA’s “twotiered” system for determining what constitutes “significant difficulty or expense”
and, thus, “undue hardship.”150 One of the second-tier factors given consideration is
the number of individuals who will need the particular accommodation to a religious
observance or practice.151 Disregarding other concerns regarding the application of
factors in tiers one and two,152 there is a significant danger (from a cost analysis point
of view) associated with taking a cumulative, numbers-based “undue hardship”
approach; one scholar has illustrated it in the following:
[A]n employer who had made an accommodation to employee X could
deny the same accommodation to employee Y because this added expense
would push the total cost of accommodation above the de minimis ceiling.
Every religious employee who requires reasonable accommodation is
entitled to some accommodation regardless of previous accommodations
the employer has made for other employees. Otherwise, a religious
employee’s accommodation would depend on the mere happenstance of
the number of other employees who had beaten him to the request.153
Similarly, Establishment Clause concerns run high where the plausibility of an
accommodation is measured, in part, by sheer numbers. For example, assume an
employer employs sixty people in a factory; out of the sixty, twenty are Catholics
148

Id. at 811-12 (suggesting that if O’Connor adopted the neutrality test, then an
accommodationist majority would exist with O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and
Kennedy, upholding Title VII as is and would likely uphold an amendment incorporating
aspects of the 1996 EEOC guidelines).
149

See 512 U.S. at 749 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that he always believed that the
Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion over others.); see also Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding, by a majority consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy, the constitutionality of New York
City’s Title I program, in part, because the services were allocated on the basis of criteria that
neither favored nor disfavored religion and because the services were available to all children
who met the Act’s eligibility requirement, no matter what their religious beliefs).
150

See supra note 107.

151

See supra note 107.

152

See supra text accompanying notes 107-113.

153

See Miller, supra note 23, at 804. Miller advocates the adoption of an “individualizing”
formula under which undue hardship would be calculated as “any yearly expenditure per
employee that exceeded fifty percent of the employer’s annual net income divided by the
average number of full-time employees. Id. at 801-802 (citing Steven B. Epstein, In Search of
a Bright Line: Determining When an Employee’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue”
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391 (1995)).
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requesting Good Friday off and two are Seventh Day Adventists requesting Saturday
off for Sabbath observance. In all likelihood, the employer can afford to
accommodate the two Seventh Day Adventists, because they only represent just over
three percent of the total workforce. However, the employer is not going to be able
to accommodate the twenty Catholics, which comprise thirty-three percent of the
workforce. If sheer numbers dictate which accommodations are made, and which
are not, then “minority” religions (those with a smaller membership) will nearly
always be granted their accommodations and, thus, will be favored over religions
with greater memberships whose members may request accommodations in larger
groups.
Consider, further, the same employer, except that this time five Catholics are
requesting Holy Saturday off and four Jewish employees are requesting the same
Saturday off for Sabbath observance.
Supposing that the employer had
predetermined that on this particular Saturday he could only accommodate six
employees without incurring an undue hardship, each group would be denied the
accommodation altogether, whereas each separately would be eligible. Granted,
neither is being “favored” over the other, but the system still lacks good sense.
Therefore, if the sponsors of the WRFA want to avoid Establishment Clause
violations and “restore the original intent of Title VII’s protections . . .”154 then the
WRFA must assure that each individual has his accommodation request reviewed
separately.
B. “Endorsement”
While Justice O’Connor’s discontentment with Lemon is evident in Kiryas Joel,
she actually began streamlining the three prongs of the Lemon test into an
“endorsement” analysis nearly two decades ago in Lynch v. Donnelly:155
Focusing on institutional entanglement and on endorsement or
disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device. . . .
The proper inquiry under the purpose prong of Lemon . . . is whether the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval
of religion. . . . [Likewise], what is crucial is that a government practice
not have the effect of communicating a message of government
endorsement or disapproval of religion.156
Four years after her opinion in Lynch, O’Connor reiterated her displeasure with
Lemon in Amos: “The inquiry framed by the Lemon test should be ‘whether
government’s purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys
a message of endorsement.’”157 A majority of the Court brought O’Connor’s

154

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

155

465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In Lynch, the Court held that
the inclusion of a creche in a city Christmas display, which included a Christmas tree, a Santa
Clause House, and seasonal banners, did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 687.
156

Id. at 689-92.

157

Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 69, 76 (1985)).
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“endorsement” analysis to the fore just two years after Amos in Allegheny v.
A.C.L.U.158 While employing the Lemon test in holding that a freestanding display
of a nativity scene on the main staircase of a county courthouse violated the
Establishment Clause, a majority in Allegheny acknowledged that the Court had, in
recent years, begun to focus on whether governmental practices had the purpose or
effect of endorsing religion.159 Recognizing the difficulty in defining “endorsement,”
and words of similar effect, the majority simply expounded: “The Establishment
Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief or from ‘making adherence to a religion relevant in any
way to a person’s standing in the political community.’”160
Practically speaking, the “endorsement” test would not alter the foregoing
Establishment Clause analysis regarding the Workplace Religious Freedom Act.
Governmental “endorsement” of religion is evident in the WRFA’s higher threshold
for “undue hardship” and its virtual mandate that employers acquiesce to employeeproposed accommodations. In short, regardless of whether Lemon’s second prong is
applied, or a revised version of Lemon’s second prong emphasizing “endorsement,”
this note concludes that the government, through the WRFA, takes an
unconstitutional position in favor of religious belief.
C. “Coercion”
Unsatisfied with the Lemon test, and blasting the “endorsement” test as “flawed
in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice,”161 Justice Kennedy authored his
own opinion in Allegheny stressing the need to examine the coercive nature of
government action:
The freedom to worship as one pleases without government interference
or oppression is the great object of both the Establishment and the Free
Exercise Clause. Banning all attempts to aid religion through government
coercion goes far toward attainment of this object.162
Kennedy’s “coercion” analysis took center stage in Lee v. Weisman, as the Court
held violative of the Establishment Clause the inclusion of prayers in a public middle
school graduation ceremony because they compelled students to conform to a
religious exercise:163

158

492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989).

159

Id. at 592.

160

Id.

161

Id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy rejected
the endorsement test, in part, because he felt that many of the traditional and historical
practices of the United States would not withstand scrutiny under its formula, e.g., The Pledge
of Allegiance describes the United States as “one Nation under God;” the Supreme Court
opens its sessions with the request that “God save the United States and this honorable Court.”
Id. at 669-74.
162

492 U.S. at 660.

163

505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
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The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of
religion does not supercede the fundamental limitations imposed by the
Establishment Clause. It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way
which “establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so.”164
Although the “coercion” test is largely confined to the school prayer cases out of
which it developed, its application to the WRFA is not out of the question.165 Still,
the WRFA’s excessive mandates in support of religion would not be spared
constitutional defeat under this test.
VII. EVER ONWARD
Title VII, as currently structured and interpreted, is, unquestionably, a socially
beneficial law; it recognizes the value of religious observance, while still respecting
the Establishment Clause by minimizing the degree to which it orders employersacrifice in the name of religion. The Workplace Religious Freedom Act,
conversely, distorts the meaning of “accommodation” and threatens to push
employers into “absolute,” and unilateral acquiescence to religious interests.
Ultimately, the cumulative effect of Establishment Clause concerns expressed herein
make the Workplace Religious Freedom Act a sure target for constitutional challenge
—which in terms of legislative scorekeeping means that WRFA is a loser before
even getting out of the gates.
While the Workplace Religious Freedom Act has been debated since 1994,166
some in Congress have openly admitted that “a substantial majority of employers are
making good faith efforts to accommodate the provisions of [Title VII . . . and] one
of the most egregious violations does not occur in private business but occurs within
Government.”167 Accordingly, this author suggests that, perhaps, Title VII is best
164

Id. at 587.

165

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), laid the groundwork for Justice Kennedy’s
development of the modern “coercion” analysis. In Engel, the Court struck down a daily
school prayer program while emphasizing that, “when the power, prestige and financial
support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain.” Id. at 431.
The “coercion” test is most appropriately used in cases like Lee and Engel where
governmental action subjects a person to a particular religious thought or exercise at a
particular time and place. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir.
1992) (upholding school district resolution allowing public high school students to choose
student volunteers to deliver “nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations” at graduation
ceremonies), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993); Brown v. Gwinnett Cty. Sch. Dist., 112
F.3d 1464 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a Georgia law mandating a moment of silence in
public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause); Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch.
Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a Mississippi statute condoning student
initiated prayer at assemblies and sporting events violates the Establishment Clause).
166

See supra note 5.

167

Hearings, supra note 31, at 4 (statement of Senator Coats).
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left untouched. Frankly, Congress must share the sentiment, otherwise WRFA
would have passed long ago, even in the face of business-lobby opposition.
Realistically, accommodations for religious practice can be achieved outside of
the context of Title VII and this note concludes with a few creative ideas for a
Congress looking to aid Sabbath and Holy Day observers.
A. Look to the Family
Few can dispute the fact that religion often forms the core of another very
important concept—family. Families attend religious services together, they pray
together at home, and they share in ceremonial rites and meals. Even families that
do not observe a formal religion still may seek spirituality in life, still encourage
members to live out certain morals and values, and may view shared time together to
be just as fulfilling as any religious service. With these thoughts in mind, Congress
should pursue a more broadly-based “Family Leave Policy.” The “Family Leave
Policy” should be one having room enough to recognize religious observance in the
scope of family life, but one that is removed from the “religiously-directed” Title VII
and one which would be equally applicable to accommodate nonreligious family
activity—a cherished American value in and of itself. The Workplace Religious
Freedom Act recognizes the potential of such a “leave policy” by seeking to ensure
that employers could not deny employees from taking leave of general usage for the
purpose of accommodating religious observance or practice.168 A limited “Family
Leave Policy” could be carved out of the existing Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).169
Basically, the FMLA provides that any employer170 must provide a minimum of
twelve workweeks of leave171 in any twelve-month period to any eligible employee172

168

S. 1124, 105th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (1997). Specifically, the WRFA states the following:

An employer shall be considered to [have committed an unlawful employment
practice] by failing to provide such a reasonable accommodation for an employee if
the employer refuses to permit the employee to utilize leave of general usage to
remove such a conflict solely because the leave will be used to accommodate the
religious observance or practice of the employee.
Id.
169

29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654. (1998).

170

The term “employer” means:

(i) any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce
who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more
calendar workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year; (ii) includes (I) any
person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer to any of the
employees of such employer; and (II) any successor in interest of an employer; (iii)
includes any “public agency,” as defined in section 203(x) of this title; and (iv)
includes the General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress.
29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (1998).
171
Leave may be unpaid except for a situation where the leave is being used by the
employee for a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the
functions of his position. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (1998). Generally, only leave which is taken
for the care of a child, spouse, or parent with a serious health condition, or because the
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for any of the following: 1) to care for a newborn child; 2) to care for a foster child;
3) to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious health condition; 4) because of
a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions
of the position of such employee.173 Because one of the major purposes for
providing the foregoing leave is “to balance the demands of the workplace with the
needs of families, to promote the stability and economic security of families, and to
promote national interests in preserving family integrity,”174 it is natural to propose a
fifth condition for leave (subsection (5) above) for “other compelling family
reasons.” Under such an amendment, an employee would be permitted to borrow a
maximum of ten days, from the previously defined twelve workweeks, in any
twelve-month period; unlike other provisions in the FMLA, the ten days could only
be used intermittently.175 So as to relieve some of the burden to the employer, the
leave would be unpaid, with no possible substitution of any paid leave or vacation
time.176 Furthermore, an employee would not be eligible to use the family leave
during any week when they also sought to utilize paid leave or vacation time.
Admittedly, leave for any “compelling family reason” creates a potential for
abuse; for example, an employee might assert use of a day in order to recover from a
hang-over. However, potential abuse can be curbed by requiring the employee to
give a minimum of fifteen days’ notice to his employer before using one of the days
and also, when requested by the employer, to give written notice of the purpose for
which the time is to be used.177
B. Maximum Hours and Schedule Control
As touched upon earlier, the Workplace Religious Freedom Act suggested
alteration of collective bargaining agreements to allow for adjustment to an
employee’s work hours in order to accommodate religious observance.178 However,
excessive tampering with collective bargaining agreements, in the context of Title
VII, could present grave Establishment Clause concerns if the Court adopted a view
of collective bargaining agreements as private.179 Still maintaining that government
employee has a serious health condition, may be taken intermittently. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1)
(1998).
172

Basically, the term “eligible employee” means an employee who has been employed 1)
for at least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested under
subsection 2612 of this title; and 2) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer
during the previous 12-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (1998); see also 29 U.S.C. §
2611(2)(B) (1998) (setting forth exclusions).
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29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(D) (1998).
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29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (1998).
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See supra note 171-173.
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See generally 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d) (1998) (identifying unpaid leave and substitution of
paid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act).
177
See generally 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e) (1998) (identifying notice requirement under Family
and Medical Leave Act).
178

See supra text accompanying note 119; see also supra note 62 (setting forth the full text
of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act).
179

See supra text accompanying notes 114-129.
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should not mandate alterations in privately negotiated accords strictly in the name of
religion, this author proposes an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act.180 An
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act could potentially benefit Sabbath
observers, while again, removing the benefit from the religiously-directed Title VII
analysis and placing the benefit in the hands of all workers—religious and
nonreligious alike.181
Basically, the Fair Labor Standards Act requires employers to pay one and onehalf times the regular rate of pay for an amount of time in excess of forty hours
worked by an employee in one week.182 The Fair Labor Standards Act regulates pay
for the above hours because “Congress finds that the existence . . . of labor
conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living
necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers . . . leads to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in
commerce . . . .”183
A substantial amount of labor discord and employee
discontentment could be relieved by allowing employees to exercise minimal control
over scheduled work hours. For example, an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards
Act could provide the following:
Upon request, no employee shall be denied scheduling control over one
“twenty-four hour block of time” (of the employee’s choice) during the
course of any week, provided that after determining the use or non-use of
said twenty-four hour period, the employee is still able to fulfill a
minimum forty hour workweek and provided that if any employee seeks
to use general leave of any kind or vacation time in the same week, he
loses the right to control over any twenty-four hour period.
What the above amendment accomplishes is an opportunity for employees, who
happen to be members of two-job households, to coordinate “off-time” with a spouse
or other family member and to prevent a workweek or weekend of overly
burdensome scheduling. The amendment also gives Sabbath observers the flexibility
to have a twenty-four hour period during any day of the week that they observe as
religiously sacred, but it does not cater specifically to them, and, thus, avoids most of
the Establishment Clause concerns previously raised with regard to Title VII and the
Workplace Religious Freedom Act. Furthermore, the amendment takes into
consideration inconvenience to employers who may only schedule shifts Monday180

29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1998).

181

This author is aware of the exemption from the Fair Labor Standard Act’s maximum
hour requirements for employers and employees covered under certain types of collective
bargaining agreements. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1998). I reiterate hesitation at infringing too
greatly upon the rights of parties to bargain collectively; however, I put forward the notion that
there is a grave difference between infringing upon those rights in the name of religion, and
infringing upon those rights in the name of all employees. I make this point as a way of
rectifying the suggestion that the amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act proposed herein
be applicable regardless of collective bargaining agreements to the contrary with my previous
discussion of Establishment Clause concerns inherent in provisions of the Workplace
Religious Freedom Act. See supra text accompanying notes 114-129.
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29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1998).
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29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1998).
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Friday by requiring that employees work a full forty hour week in order to exert
control over one twenty-four hour period i.e. employees who traditionally work only
Monday-Friday would be prevented from utilizing the Act to schedule an extra day
off during the week. Ultimately, the amendment would promote a fair and flexible
work atmosphere “without substantially curtailing employment or earning power,”184
and without appearing to favor only religiously-dedicated employees.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Unquestionably, religious observance is an important aspect of the lives of many,
and no one should be forced to sacrifice his/her beliefs. However, the Workplace
Religious Freedom Act is sloppy, constitutionally ill-fated legislation that should be
forgotten. Congressional time would best be spent revising existing labor legislation
to provide broadly-based “Family Leave Policies” or to grant minimal scheduling
control to employees; then, both programs can be voluntarily applied towards
religious observances rather than unconstitutionally mandated.
GREGORY J. GAWLIK185
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